SAUDIA FLIGHT 163

On August 19, 1980, Saudia Flight 163 caught fire after takeoff from Riyadh International Airport, Saudi Arabia. After the aircraft made a successful emergency landing back to the airport, all people on board died from smoke inhalation. With 301 fatalities, Flight 163 remains the deadliest accident involving the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar aircraft.

The Flight 163 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi, Pakistan to Jeddah International Airport, Saudi Arabia, with an intermediate stop at Riyadh International Airport, Saudi Arabia. The pilot-in-command was captain Mohammed Ali Khowyter, who had 7 674 hours of flying experience. The first officer was Sami Abdullah M. Hasanain, who had 1 615 total flight hours to his credit, and the flight engineer was Bradley Curtis, an American with 650 hours of flying experience. The aircraft involved was a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, registered as HZ-AHK. The aircraft was delivered new to Saudia on August, 21, 1979.

Flight 163 departed Quaid-e-Azam International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan at 13:32 UTC.  The flight landed at Riyadh for a scheduled intermediate stop at 16:06 UTC. After a two-hour layover for refueling, the aircraft took off for the final leg to Jeddah at 18:08 UTC. Few minutes after takeoff the flight the crew received warnings of smoke from the cargo compartment. Visual and aural warnings indicated smoke in the aft cargo compartment C-3. After the presence of smoke in the cabin was confirmed, captain decided to return to the airport, and the first officer radioed their intentions at 18:20 UTC. Because passengers where fighting and panicking in the aisles, the captain asked everybody to remain seated. At 18:25 UTC, the thrust lever for the number two engine became jammed as the fire burned through the operating cable. Then, at 18:29 UTC, the engine was shut down during final approach. At 18:35 UTC, captain declared an emergency and landed back at Riyadh. After touchdown at 18:36 UTC, the aircraft continued to a taxiway at the end of the runway, where it stopped at 18:39 UTC. The aircraft used the entire length of a runway to slow and then exit onto the taxiway.

Once the aircraft had stopped, the crew reported the tower that they were shutting down the engines and about to evacuate. The engines were shut down at 18:42 UTC, at which point communication with the crew was lost. No external fire was visible at this time, but flames were observed through the windows at the rear of the aircraft. Because no evacuation had been initiated by then, fire and rescue personnel started to open the doors. At 19:05 UTC they succeeded in opening door 2R. Few minutes later, the aircraft burst into flames, and was consumed by fire. None of the occupants survived the fire.

Why captain failed to evacuate the aircraft promptly is not known. Saudi reports stated that the crew could not get the plug-type doors to open in time. It is assumed that most passengers and flight attendants were incapacitated during the landing roll, or they did not attempt to open a door on a moving aircraft. It is known that the aircraft remained pressurized during the landing roll as the cabin pressurization system was on standby, and the aircraft was found with both pressurization hatches almost completely closed. The pressurization hatches should have opened completely on touchdown to depressurize the aircraft. The crew were found still in their seats, and all the victims were found in the forward half of the fuselage. Autopsies were conducted on some of the non-Saudi nationals, including the American flight engineer. All of them perished from smoke inhalation and not burns, which indicated that they had died long before the 2R door was opened. The source of the fire in compartment C-3 could not be determined.

Factors contributing to the fatal results of this accident were the failure of the captain to prepare the cabin crew for immediate evacuation upon landing and his failure in not making a maximum stop landing on the runway, with immediate evacuation. The captain also failed to properly utilize his flight crew throughout the emergency.

The captain Mohammed Ali Khowyter, was hired by Saudia in 1965. He had flown numerous aircraft such as Douglas DC-3, DC-4, McDonnell Douglas DC-9, Boeing 707 and 737. His records described him as a slow learner and needing more proper training. Khowyter had 7 674 flying hours, including 388 hours in the TriStar. The first officer Sami Abdullah M. Hasanain joined the airline in 1977 and had previously worked as a trainee. He received his type rating on the TriStar eleven days before the accident. At one point during his training, however, due to his poor performance, Hasanain was removed from flying school. Hasanain had 1 615 flying hours, including 125 hours in the TriStar. The flight engineer Bradley Curtis was hired by the airline in 1974. He had been qualified as a captain of the Douglas DC-3, and was then assigned to train in either the Boeing 707 or 737, but failed to qualify as both a captain and as a first officer because he did not meet the requirements. He had needed to pay for his own training as an TriStar flight engineer in order to keep his job. Curtis had 650 flying hours, including 157 hours in the TriStar.


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